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Private Policing of Financial Crime: Fraud 
Examiners in White-Collar Crime Investigations 
Professor Petter Gottschalk, BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway 
 
ABSTRACT 
Fraud examiners in white-collar crime investigations represent private policing of financial 
crime. Examiners in crime investigations reconstruct the past to create an account of who did 
what to make it happen or let it happen. This article addresses the following research 
question: What is the contribution from fraud examiners in private investigative policing of 
white-collar crime? Contributions are considered benefits from an investigation. Benefits 
should exceed costs to make private policing a profitable investment. Based on analysis of 
five U.S. cases and eight Norwegian cases, private policing does not seem profitable. 
 
Keywords: private policing, financial crime, white-collar crime, investigation reports, fraud 
examinations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When suspicions of misconduct and crime emerge in business and public organizations, 
private investigators are often hired to reconstruct the past. Private investigators are typically 
fraud examiners from major accounting firms and law firms. Examiners are hired to conduct a 
goal-oriented procedure of creating an account of what has happened, how it happened, why it 
happened, and who did what to make it happen or let it happen (Gottschalk, 2015). When 
examiners move into the latter question of who did what to make it happen or let it happen, 
then the examination resembles a criminal investigation normally conducted by law 
enforcement in the police at local and national levels (Osterburg and Ward, 2014).  
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Private policing by fraud examinations represents a privatization of law enforcement. Often, 
results from reports of private investigations are not communicated to public police, even 
when fraud examiners have collected solid evidence of law violations. There are many 
reasons for secrecy (Gottschalk, 2016a). Especially in cases where top executives and 
investors and others from the elite are investigated for potential white-collar crime, then 
organizations tend to avoid public attention. 
As a result, reports of investigations are difficult to find to evaluate the quality of private 
policing in cases of financial crime suspicions in general and white-collar crime suspicions in 
particular. After two years of searching in the United States and Norway, it was possible to 
obtain 13 reports and 40 reports respectively. 5 out of 13 fraud examinations in the United 
States can be linked to white-collar crime, while 8 out of 40 fraud examinations in Norway 
can be linked to white-collar crime. 
In this article, five U.S. reports and eight Norwegian reports of investigations from fraud 
examiners are evaluated to answer the following research question: What is the contribution 
from fraud examiners in private investigative policing of white-collar crime? 
 
REPORTS OF INVESTIGATIONS 
Fraud examiners conduct private inquiries into suspicions of white-collar crime. There is a 
small but growing body of research on private white-collar crime investigators. Brooks and 
Button (2011) and Button and Gee (2013) discuss police prosecutors potential dependence on 
private examinations of financial crime suspicion. They also discuss punishment and innocent 
victims of private investigations. In a survey by Brooks et al., (2009), 17 out of 32 companies 
in the UK responded that they employ dedicated counter fraud staff, which in total accounted 
to 160 employees, while 13 had no specialist staff, and 2 did not answer the question. Button 
et al. (2007a, 2007b) and Tunley et al. (2014) discuss the lack of competence among fraud 
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examiners. As argued by Gill and Hart (1997), private policing is directly accountable to the 
paying customers rather than democratically elected bodies and tight legalistic procedures and 
constraints. Meerts (2014) found that corporations and organizations generally value the 
possibility of secrecy, discretion, and control that private investigations bring to corporate 
security. Openness could lead to problems such as reputational loss, which can have economic 
repercussions. In the same book edited by Walby and Lippert, Williams (2014) discusses the 
private eyes of corporate culture in terms of the forensic accounting and corporate 
investigation industry and the production of corporate financial security. Button et al. (2009) 
found that 68 % of fraud victims report strong feelings of anger. 
Reports of investigations by fraud examiners are typically written at the final stage of private 
investigations. Reports are handed over to clients who pay for the work. Reports are seldom 
disclosed, so that the public never learn about them. Reports are often protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, when investigating firms are law firms. Therefore, it is quite a 
challenge to identify and obtain a sample of investigation reports to empirically evaluate and 
test convenience in white-collar crime. It is not easy to gain access to private investigation 
reports for research.  
This article documents findings from a sample of reports acquired in the United States as well 
as a sample of reports acquired in Norway. The samples are the result of non-probability 
purposive sampling, and thus we cannot confidently claim they represent all private 
investigations in neither the United States nor Norway. At the same time, the method of 
obtaining the reports included enough versatility in identifying the private investigation cases 
where investigators wrote reports, and seeking out these reports. Methods of identifying and 
obtaining reports included media coverage, digital searchers, tips from friends and colleagues, 
and student searches. Therefore, the samples can serve as tentative ways to get an 
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approximate idea of the variety of white-collar crime suspicions being first detected or further 
investigated by private fraud examiners. 
Reports of investigations vary in length. In the following samples, U.S. reports range from 12 
pages to 874 pages, while Norwegian reports range from 4 pages to 555 pages. The shortest 
ones are typically summary reports or reports from very limited investigations.  
A typical example of an investigation report is the report of investigation regarding 
procurement practices at the Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO) of the District 
of Columbia. The report was written by law firm Sidley Austin LLP in Washington, DC and 
submitted by the Committee on Government Operations and the Environment at the Council 
of the District of Columbia by councilmember Mary Cheh. 
The report by Sidley (2010) consists of sixty pages with the following table of contents: 
I. Introduction and executive summary 
II. Scope of investigation 
III. Background 
IV. Findings concerning the execution of Acar’s schemes 
V. Findings on procurement and related vulnerabilities 
VI. Recommendations 
VII. Appendix 
Focus in the report is on Yusuf Acar, a mid-level manager at OCTO who was arrested in 2009 
for fraud related to procurement misconduct. The report documents the private investigation 
into Acar’s procurement fraud at OCTO as well as recommendations for changes to the 
controls and procedures designed to assist in preventing fraudulent conduct of the type 
committed by Acar. The investigation did not actively seek to determine whether similar 
types of fraudulent activity were still taking place at OCTO. Nor did the investigation seek to 
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determine the guilt or innocence of any of the participants in Acar’s scheme. Those issues 
were addressed by the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. 
Reports of investigations vary both in length and in quality. Some reports are ill-structured 
and difficult to read. Other reports communicate messages very well to readers. Reports 
contain information that readers have to transform into knowledge by understanding sentences 
and sections. 
 
SAMPLE OF U.S. REPORTS 
In the spring of 2015, it was possible to identify and obtain a total of 13 fraud examination 
reports as listed in the table. The listed reports are concerned with a variety of issues such as 
the ignition switch failure at General Motors and the collapse of the bank Lehman Brothers as 
well as the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. The table lists the case, the investigator, 
suspicion, and number of pages in the report. 
 
# Case Investigator Suspicion Pages 
1 Acar 
Manager at DC’s office 
of technology 
Sidley (2010) 
Law firm 
Bribery, conspiracy, money 
laundering, and conflict of 
interest 
60 
2 Coatesville 
School district 
superintendent and 
director 
BDO (2014d) 
Auditing firm 
Missing income statements 
and improper expenses 
54 
3 Enron 
Energy company 
collapse 
Powers et al. 
(2002) 
Committee 
Accounting fraud by top 
executives in the company 
218 
4 General Motors 
Ignition switch failure 
Valukas (2014) 
Law firm 
Failure not reported and 
ignored by executives to 
maximize profits 
325 
5 Lehman Brothers 
Bank collapse 
Valukas (2010) 
Law firm 
Bad and fraudulent decision 
making by executives caused 
confidence loss 
229 
6 Motorola 
Telecommunications 
company’s results 
SEC (2002) 
Securities 
Commission 
Senior official selectively 
disclosed inside information 
about the company’s sales 
12 
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7 Padakhep 
Bangladesh non-
government 
organization 
Inspector 
General (2012) 
Official 
Acts of misappropriation and 
a fraud scheme by recipients 
32 
8 Peregrine  
Financial group CEO 
Berkeley (2013) 
Research group 
How former CEO conducted 
fraud and caused company 
failure 
160 
9 Philadelphia 
Police department 
Pennsylvania 
(1974) 
Commission 
Police corruption and 
misconduct in law 
enforcement 
874 
10 Sandstorm 
Bank of Credit and 
Commerce 
International 
PwC (1991) 
Auditing firm 
Money laundering and illegal 
transfers of funds from Bank 
of India 
50 
11 Walters 
Tax assessment 
manager in District of 
Columbia 
WilmerHale and 
PwC (2008) 
Law firm 
Theft of tax refunds by 
cashing returned checks and 
depositing into own bank 
accounts 
126 
12 Wildenthal 
Director at University 
of Texas Medical 
Center 
Breen and 
Guberm. (2012) 
Law firm 
Spending of university funds 
for personal travel and 
entertainment 
365 
13 WorldCom 
Telecommunication 
company bankruptcy 
Wilmer and 
PwC (2003) 
Auditing firm 
CEO involved in fraud, 
conspiracy and filing of false 
documents with regulators 
345 
 
Sample of U.S. Reports of Investigations by Fraud Examiners 
 
The variety of financial crime suspicions is interesting to note in the table. Also, the variety in 
pages is interesting, where the Philadelphia investigation ended up as a thick book published 
by the Pennsylvania (1994) commission.  
 
SAMPLE OF NORWEGIAN REPORTS 
In the spring of 2014, it was possible to identify and obtain a total of 40 fraud examination 
reports as listed in the table. The listed reports are concerned with a variety of issues such as 
embezzlement by the chief executive officer in a church foundation and corruption in building 
maintenance in a municipality. 
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# Case Investigator Suspicion Pages 
1 Adecco nursing home Wiersholm (2011) Work climate violation 23 
2 Ahus hospital maps PwC (2013a) Procurement fraud 15 
3 Andebu municipality BDO (2014a) Executive roles abused 23 
4 Betanien foundation BDO (2014b) Embezzlement 
committed 
10 
5 Briskeby sports Lynx (2011) Construction fund abused 267 
6 Eckbo foundation Thommessen (2009) Foundation fund abused 119 
7 Fadder foundation BDO (2011) Documentation falsified 46 
8 Military contracts Dalseide (2006) Procurement corruption 184 
9 Furuheim foundation Hald (2006) Building fund abused 164 
10 Gassnova controls BDO (2013a) Procurement abused 27 
11 Hadeland broadband PwC (2014a) Embezzlement 
committed 
32 
12 Hadeland energy PwC (2014b) Embezzlement 
committed 
25 
13 Halden ice hall KPMG (2012) Construction funds 
abused 
121 
14 Halden municipality Hjort (2013) Manager bribed 46 
15 Hordaland police Wiersholm (2015) Whistleblower harrassed 111 
16 Kraft & Kultur Ernst & Young (2012) Accounting manipulated 31 
17 Kragerø boating Deloitte (2012) Leader overpaid 109 
18 Kvam Auto Wikborg (2015) Private expenses covered 93 
19 Langemyhr building PwC (2008a) Municipality overbilled 27 
20 Lindeberg nursing Kommunerev. (2013) Assault committed 92 
21 Lunde bankruptcy Vierdal (2012) Funds disappeared 86 
22 Moskva School Ernst & Young (2013a) Private expenses covered 52 
23 NFF soccer players Lynx (2012) Sport clubs mislead 48 
24 NIF sports players BDO (2014c) Sport clubs bribed 4 
25 Norsk Tipping betting Deloitte (2010) Funds wrongly 
transferred 
61 
26 Omsorgsbygg Spain PwC (2009) Funds abused 92 
27 Oslo Vei bankruptcy Kvale (2013) Funds wrongly 
transferred 
53 
28 Romerike water Distriktsrevisjon (2007) Assets privatized 555 
29 Samferdselsetaten PwC (2007) Department bribed 88 
30 Skjervøy fisheries KomRev (2015) Assets abused 138 
31 Stangeskovene 
owners 
Ernst & Young (2013b) Stock transfer prevented 103 
32 Stavanger Turkey PwC (2013b) Public money abused 13 
33 Sykehuset hospital Haavind (2011) Executive power abused 15 
34 Terra Rana funding PwC (2008b) Funds disappeared 52 
35 Troms Kraft energy Norscan (2013) Funds abused 38 
36 Undervisningsbygg I Kommunerev. (2006a) Project manager bribed 30 
37 Undervisningsbygg II Kommunerev. (2006b) Property manager bribed 44 
38 Verdibanken funds Wiersholm (2012) Stroh man abused 5 
39 Videoforhandlere BDO (2013b) Subsidy misdirected 20 
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40 World Ventures Stiftelsestilsyn (2014) Pyramid scheme 17 
Sample of Norwegian Reports of Investigations by Fraud Examiners 
 
It is interesting to note that out of forty investigations, twenty-four were conducted by 
auditing firms, thirteen by law firms, and three by other firms. While the auditing firms are 
global, such as PwC, BDO, and Ernst & Young, all law firms are local.  
 
CRIME IN U.S. REPORTS 
Only 5 out of 13 fraud examinations from the United States can be linked to white-collar 
crime, where one or more white-collar criminals were convicted to prison in each case. These 
5 investigation reports are listed in the next table. The table applies convenience theory to the 
sample. Convenience theory suggests that white-collar crime is convenient in the economical, 
organizational as well as the behavioral dimension (Gottschalk, 2016b). 
 
 
 
# 
 
 
Case 
ECONOMICAL 
DIMENSION 
Threat or 
opportunity as 
motive for crime 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
DIMENSION 
Opportunity in 
trusted position to 
commit crime 
BEHAVIORAL 
DIMENSION 
Personal 
acceptance of 
criminal activity 
1 Acar 
Manager at 
DC’s office of 
technology 
Sidley (2010) 
law firm 
Acar had lost 
money as owner 
of a firm. He 
found it 
convenient to 
recover his loss 
by abusing his 
new position 
Acar perpetrated a 
wide-ranging fraud 
involving technology 
contracts by favoring 
certain vendors. As 
security officer, he 
could monitor all other 
activities 
Acar had a deal 
with vendors that 
he expected never 
would be 
detected. He ran 
operations so 
efficiently that no 
real loss was 
caused 
3 Enron 
Energy company 
collapse 
Powers et al. 
(2002) 
committee 
It was important 
for top 
management to 
show a successful 
and profitable 
company to the 
stock marked and 
their friends 
Top management 
manipulated accounting 
figures and create fake 
transactions between 
entities to make it look 
as though the company 
was profitable 
Top management 
found they could 
justify financial 
statements and 
found themselves 
eligible to large 
payments 
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9 Philadelphia 
Police 
department 
Pennsylvania 
(1974) 
Commission 
Police officers 
were not very 
well paid, so they 
found it 
convenient to 
supplement their 
income with 
bribes from 
organized 
criminals 
Organized criminals 
found it useful to bribe 
police officers, since 
they represented law 
enforcement that could 
create obstacles for 
their gambling and 
prostitution businesses 
Taking bribes 
from organized 
criminals to look 
the other way was 
very common in 
the police force. 
Everybody did it 
to some extent, 
and it had become 
regular practice 
11 Walters 
Tax assessment 
manager in 
District of 
Columbia 
WilmerHale and 
PwC (2008) law 
firm 
She wanted to 
help family, 
friends, 
colleagues and 
herself to a better 
standard of living 
When tax returns were 
issued to people who in 
the meantime had died, 
she could cash the 
checks herself. It was 
her responsibility to 
handle tax returns in the 
tax administration  
People were dead 
anyway, so there 
were no victims. 
Also, she found 
the tax 
administration 
inefficient and 
bureaucratic 
13 WorldCom 
Telecommunicat
ion company 
bankruptcy 
Wilmer and 
PwC (2003) 
Auditing firm 
Ebbers wanted to 
acquire all kinds 
of properties 
based on 
substantial loans 
from banks 
He initiated false and 
unsubstantiated 
accounting entries to 
create a stock value that 
could support his loans 
His narcissistic 
trait was based on 
previous success 
with WorldCom 
and as a private 
businessman 
Convenience theory applied to the U.S. sample of investigation reports 
 
The first case is concerned with Yusuf Acar, who was convicted to prison for bribery, 
conspiracy, money laundering, and conflict of interest related to procurement improperties. 
He exploited his position within the security division at the District of Columbia’s Office of 
the Chief Technology Officer. In terms of convenience, Acar found it convenient to solve his 
problems in the economical dimension by means of white-collar crime. His problem or threat 
was that he had lost money as one of the owners of an information technology firm. He never 
got paid when he transferred his stocks to someone else. To complensate for his previous loss, 
he found it convenient to recover the loss by abusing his new position as a manager at DC’s 
office of technology (Sidley, 2010). 
In the organizational dimension, Yusuf Acar went into a criminal partnership with vendors. 
An important partner in crime was Sushil Bansal, the president and chief executive of a local 
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vendor, Advanced Integrated Technology Corporation. Their fraud scheme grew more and 
more, reflecting that Acar and Bansal’s growing confidence that there were no mechanisms in 
place to detect their fraud. The intial scheme was a basic kickback procedure. Bansal’s 
company had been awarded a contract to provide temporary contractors to the security 
division. Bansal had tendered a number of candidates, but Acar had recjected them as 
unqualified. After failed attempts to place Bansal’s people, Farrukh Awan, a contractor, 
approached Acar and proposed the following: Acar would independently locale qualified 
candidates for the security division and allow Bansal to hire those individuals. Bansal would 
then offer the candidates to Acar, and Acar would approve them. In exchange, Acar and 
Awan would receive a kickback from Bansal for part of the value of each contract. Over time, 
Awan’s role was phased out, while Bansal and Acar continued the arrangement on their own 
(Sidley, 2010). 
In the behavioral dimension, Acar explained that from his perspective, the arrangement 
provided him with a bonus payment for hiring individuals he would have hired anyway, and 
had the additional benefit of allowing him to do his job at OCTO more effectively by 
retaining more competent contractors (Sidley, 2010).   
 
CRIME IN NORWEGIAN REPORTS 
Only 8 out of 40 fraud examinations Norway can be linked to white-collar crime, where one 
or more white-collar criminals were convicted to prison in each case. These 7 investigation 
reports are listed in the next table. The table applies convenience theory to the Norwegian 
sample of investigation reports (Gottschalk, 2016b).  
 
 
 
# 
 
 
Case 
ECONOMICAL 
DIMENSION 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
DIMENSION 
BEHAVIORAL 
DIMENSION 
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Threat or 
opportunity as 
motive for crime 
Opportunity in 
trusted position to 
commit crime 
Personal 
acceptance of 
criminal activity 
4 Betanien foundation 
BDO (2014b) 
Opportunity for 
private real estate 
and parties with 
prostitutes 
CEO was in complete 
control over money 
transfers from Norway 
to Spain 
Lack of self-
control made his 
desire for 
adventure 
9 Furuheim 
foundation Hald 
(2006) 
Their own 
corporate 
enterprises 
needed more 
business to 
become profitable 
As board members they 
were able to allocate 
lucrative contracts to 
their own enterprises 
They had learned 
in the maintenance 
business 
11 Hadeland 
broadband PwC 
(2014a) 
He wanted to 
impress his new 
girlfriend with a 
luxury lifestyle 
He was alone in charge 
of money transfers 
between subsidiaries 
He blamed lack of 
control and poor 
auditing work 
12 Hadeland energy 
PwC (2014b) 
He wanted to 
impress his new 
girlfriend with a 
luxury lifestyle 
He was alone in charge 
of money transfers 
between subsidiaries 
He blamed lack of 
control and poor 
auditing work 
21 Lunde bankruptcy 
Vierdal (2012) 
Desire to develop 
a business empire 
in the shortest 
time possible 
A number of acrobatic 
financial transactions 
in the conglomerate of 
companies 
Lunde blamed 
banks for having 
caused bankruptcy 
28 Romerike water 
Distriktsrevisjon 
(2007) 
Ambition to 
become a hero 
locally and rich 
abroad 
Controlled and 
threatened individuals 
to comply with his 
instructions 
Found that he 
deserved 
admiration as well 
as benefits 
36 Undervisningsbygg 
I 
Kommunerev. 
(2006a) 
Suppliers were his 
friend with whom 
he entered into a 
fraudulent scheme 
of kickbacks 
It was accepted in the 
organization that Nettli 
was not competent in 
formalities and 
procedures and thus 
ignored them 
He found that the 
organization was 
so inefficient that it 
did not really 
matter 
37 Undervisningsbygg 
II 
Kommunerev. 
(2006b) 
Murud was so 
greedy that he 
wanted more cars, 
larger house, and 
bigger boat 
Lack of approval 
control made him 
exceed his approval 
limit for invoiced that 
were fake 
He blamed 
Undervisningsbygg 
for not having 
proper controls of 
employees’ 
financial 
transactions 
Convenience theory applied to the Norwegian sample of investigation reports 
 
The first case is concerned with Are Blomhoff, who was convicted to prison for 
embezzlement. He was a priest and a trusted CEO in the Betanien church foundation. While 
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establishing a nursing home run by the Christian foundation in Spain, he transferred some of 
the money from Norway to Spain to his private bank account in Spain. He spent the money on 
his own housing project in Spain as well as on parties with guests and prostitutes in Spain 
(BDO, 2014b).  
In the economical dimension of convenience theory, Are Blomhoff had a strong desire for a 
personal real estate in Spain as well as enjoyed sex with paid younger women. He felt 
strongly attracted to spending some of the foundations money on private parties where some 
of his trusted colleagues participated. He felt a desire to establish himself in Spain with a 
completely different lifestyle than at home in Norway (BDO, 2014b). 
In the organizational dimension, Blomhoff was completely in charge of all activities in Spain 
as well as all money transfers from Norway to Spain related to the new nursing home. 
Nobody was required to approve his transactions, and nobody were granted insight into his 
transactions. The board at the Christian foundation had complete trust in him as the chief 
executive and as a priest (BDO, 2014b). 
In the behavioral dimension, the priest regrets what he has done. He blames his lack of self-
control when phased with opportunities for fun and parties in the sunny and warm Spanish 
environment. He admits to wrongdoing and applies no neutralization techniques. Blomhoff 
believes that his completely different lifestyle in Spain as compared to his lifestyle back home 
in Norway can be explained by his desire to experience new adventures he never could allow 
himself at home (BDO, 2014b). 
 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. REPORTS 
In this article, five U.S. reports and eight Norwegian reports of investigations from fraud 
examiners are evaluated to answer the following research question: What is the contribution 
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from fraud examiners in private investigative policing of white-collar crime? First, we 
analyze five private policing reports from the United States.  
The Committee on Government Operations in the District of Columbia charged Sidley (2010) 
with investigating Acar’s procurement fraud at the office of the chief technology officer and 
recommending changes to the controls and procedures designed to assist in preventing 
fraudulent conduct of the type committed by Acar. While Acar was arrested and charged on 
March 12, 2009, the committee authorized the investigation on April 2, 2009. Since the 
private investigation was initiated after the public arrest, the question arises whether or not 
Sidley (2010) was able to reveal new facts and evidence that were not already known to the 
public prosecutor. While the report of investigation details various fraud schemes applied by 
Acar, it seems that nothing new emerges from Sidley’s investigation. The only contribution 
seems to be that a chronological sequence of events is documented in the report. When the 
report is evaluated as an investment, where examiners’ costs have to be compared to potential 
benefits, the only benefits seem to be recommendations starting on page 37 and ending on 
page 43 in the report. Most – if not all – recommendations are quite obvious. 
The Board of Directors at Enron charged Powers et al. (2002) with investigating transactions 
between Enron and investment partnerships created and managed by Andrew S. Fastow, 
Enron’s former executive vice president and chief financial officer, and by other Enron 
executives who worked with Fastow. The mandate is different from the focus of the public 
prosecutor, and investigators were able to explain the substance of the most significant 
transactions and highlight their most important accounting, corporate governance, 
management oversight, and public disclosure issues. However, as argued by examiners 
Powers et al. (2002: 1), “An exhaustive investigation of these related-party transactions would 
require time and resources beyond those available.” Furthermore, “Certain former Enron 
employees who (we were told) played substantial roles in one or more of the transactions 
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under investigation – including Fastow, Michael J. Kopper, and Ben F. Glisan, Jr. – declined 
to be interviewed either entirely or with respect to some issues. We have had only limited 
access to certain work papers of Arthur Andersen LLP, Enron’s outside auditors, and no 
access to materials in the possession of the Fastow partnerships or their limited partners. 
Information from these sources could affect our conclusions.” Given these limitations, results 
from the private investigation documented in the examiners’ report are questionable. 
Consequently, considered as an investment, the benefits of the investigation do not 
necessarily exceed the costs. 
The Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged the Pennsylvania Crime 
Commission with investigating police corruption and the quality of law enforcement in 
Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania (1974) report clearly documents substantial evidence of 
systematic patterns of corruption in Philadelphia. The report details results of the 
commission’s eighteen-month intensive investigation. While the investigation required 
substantial resources over a long period of time, the benefits do also seem to be substantial. 
Police officers were later sentenced to prison, and the Philadelphia police department was 
completely reorganized. Investigators were far ahead of public prosecutors in this case.  
The Council of the District of Columbia charged WilmerHale and PwC (2008) with 
determining how Harriette Walters was able to embezzle more than $48 million of District 
funds over nearly 20 years and with recommending changes in controls, work environment, 
and oversight structures. Harriette Walters had already pleaded guilty to federal charges 
related to the theft of over $48 million when WilmerHale and PwC carried out their 
investigation. The investigation focused on three fundamental questions. First, how did the 
fraud occur? Second, why did the scheme go undetected for so long? Third, what changes can 
be made? Given this mandate, private investigators had a wider mandate compared to the 
criminal investigation and prosecution of Walters in court. WilmerHale and PwC (2008) were 
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able to report convincing answers to the three questions. Consequently, the benefits of the 
investigation seem to be substantial, while the costs may not have been that large. Cost-
benefit in this investigation seems to be a favorable ratio. 
The Board of Directors of WorlCom charged Wilmer and PwC (2003) with investigating 
accounting irregularities at WorldCom including certain actions by the board of directors or 
its members, including the authorization of large loans and guaranties by WorldCom to CEO 
Ebbers. The scope of the authority granted to investigators was very broad, making it 
necessary for them to refine and focus their undertaking. Wilmer and PwC (2003: 35) 
conclude that in sum, “WorldCom was a company driven overwhelmingly by a perceived 
need to meet unrealistic securities market expectations that its own executives had fostered, 
without any institutional culture in which integrity was valued, without the benefit of policies 
and procedures covering important matters of governance, and without effective oversight of 
an active and engaged board of directors. It was headed by a chief executive officer with a 
dominant personality, who was able to act largely unchecked. The chief financial officer – 
himself a strong figure – could direct employees to take action they knew or believed was 
improper, and the employees would comply.” This is interesting, but certainly no news in 
2003. Already the year before, WorldCom admitted to four billion dollars in accounting 
misstatement. This initiated a series of police investigations and public legal proceedings, 
which focused on Bernard Ebbers. It seems that the only benefit from the Wilmer and PwC 
(2003) investigation was to get a 345 pages report that documented transactions and actors. 
The cost of this investigation, however, seems to have overrun the benefit. 
 
ANALYSIS OF NORWEGIAN REPORTS 
After five U.S. reports, eight Norwegian reports of investigations from fraud examiners are 
evaluated to answer the research question concerned with contributions from examinations.  
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The Board of Directors at the Betanien Foundation charged BDO (2014b) with investigating 
and detecting further misconduct and financial crime by the chief executive officer. 
Investigators were able to detect twice as much embezzled money than was previously 
known.  The embezzled amount rose to 21 million Norwegian kroner, which is equivalent of 3 
million U.S. dollars. Assuming that the investigation costs were about one million kroner, 
benefits from the investigation seem to have exceeded the costs. 
The board at Furuheim Foundation charged Hald (2006) with investigating management and 
business practices in the foundation. In the course of investigation, suspicions grew towards 
two persons involved in misconduct. After a while, public police got involved, and private 
investigators completed their job. Assuming that public prosecution and court sentencing 
would not have happened if Hald (2006) were unsuccessful in their investigation, we may 
conclude that the investigation made a significant contribution. 
The Board of Directors at Hadeland Energy charged PricewaterhouseCoopers with 
investigating both the energy company (PwC, 2014b) and the broadband company (PwC, 
2014a) to detect potentially more embezzled money by the chief financial officer. 
Investigators made no new findings, and thus made no contribution except documenting what 
was already known. 
The District Court of Stavanger charged Vierdal (2012) with investigating the Lunde 
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy lawyers were able to identify misconduct and potential crime that 
was later publicly prosecuted in court. Therefore, the extended bankruptcy audit may 
represent a profitable investment. 
The Board of Directors at Romerike Water Supply charged Distriktsrevisjonen (2007) with 
investigating fraud by the chief executive officer and other key actors. The private 
investigators followed up on newspaper accounts concerning misconduct and crime. They 
found substantial evidence of white-collar crime, and evidence was handed over to the police. 
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In the sequence of events, it seems that the private investigation represented a profitable 
investment.  
The City of Oslo charged Kommunerevisjonen (2006a, 2006b) with investigating two 
independent fraud suspicions in the same organizational unit. Investigators did not provide 
any information or insight that was not already known to the city and public prosecutors at 
that time. Therefore, these two investigations seem to result in negative cost-benefit analysis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In a perspective of comparative criminal justice, this article has presented empirical evidence 
from both Norway and the United States. There seems to be no relevant differences between 
legislation or private investigations in the two nations, making the findings comparable.  
An investment is only profitable if benefits exceed costs. Cost-benefit analysis for an 
investment is concerned with whether or not the investment is profitable. When cost-benefit 
analysis is applied to private policing of financial crime in terms of fraud examiners in white-
collar crime investigations, then it should be expected that benefits exceed costs. In this 
article, five U.S. reports and eight Norwegian reports of investigations from fraud examiners 
were evaluated to answer the following research question: What is the contribution from fraud 
examiners in private investigative policing of white-collar crime? Contributions were here 
defined as benefits from investigations. In our sample, most investigations had limited 
contributions, and costs seem to have exceeded benefits, thereby making private policing an 
unprofitable investment in most cases. 
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